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‘There Is No Alternative’ (TINA) was one of Margaret Thatcher’s infamous slogans. For 
Thatcher this was a normative slogan, a part of her ideological struggle. She wanted to convince 
people that her neoliberal policies were the only possible policies, other alternatives had been left 
on the scrap heap of history. My use of the same wording in the title of this article is not meant to 
be normative, but rather descriptive. It describes the really existing political situation in Europe 
today. Thus, it also describes the enormous challenge which the trade union and labour 
movement in Europe faces, the lack of alternatives to the current neoliberal, austerity policies or, 
to put  it bluntly, the deep ideological and political crisis of the left. 
 The background to the extreme austerity policies which are now being pursued in large 
parts of Europe are well known to most people. The financial crisis hit Europe at full strength in 
autumn 2008. To prevent a collapse of the world’s financial markets governments introduced 
massive economic rescue packages. Most governments took up enormous loans to finance these 
packages, something which led them into a debt crisis. 
 Many people expected that the financial crisis, with its ruinous consequences, would 
mean the final goodbye to neoliberalism, speculation economies and the dominance of free 
market forces. This policy had led to a dramatic redistribution of wealth – from labour to capital, 
from the public to the private sector, and from the poor to the rich. The system was thus 
discredited – and now the politicians surely had to realise that systematic deregulation, 
privatisation and free-flow capitalism had failed – and had actually become directly destructive. 
The time had come for control and regulation. So many people thought. 
 But that is not what happened. The governments did not seize the opportunity to ensure 
increased democratic control and lasting public ownership of the financial institutions. There 
were admittedly, in the wake of the crisis, a number of proposals about regulating financial 
markets and imposing taxes on financial institutions and financial transactions. The elites and the 
money-grubbers were obviously nervous of the reactions among people. However, actions of a 
sort which could threaten their interests failed to appear. Proposals of this kind, therefore, have 
increasingly been toned down.  
 On the contrary, what we have seen are draconian austerity programmes, massive 
privatisation of whatever is left to privatise and enormous attacks on public sector wages, pensions 
and trade union rights – particularly in the most crisis-ridden countries. Pensions have been cut 
by up to 15–20 percent, while the wage level in the public sector has been reduced by anything 
from 5 percent (Spain) to over 40 percent (in the Baltic). Collective agreements and trade union 
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rights are being set aside – not via negotiations with trade unions but via government decrees and 
political decisions. This has happened in at least ten European Union (EU) countries (the Baltic 
states, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland). If the trade union and 
labour movement is unable to contain this development, it may be facing a decisive and historic 
defeat in Europe. 
 How could this happen in a part of the world which has harboured some of the strongest 
and most militant trade union and labour movements in the world? Why has opposition and 
resistance not been stronger? How is it that most of the proposals for regulation and increased 
democratic control vanished like dew before the sun? And who could imagine that quite a few of 
the enormous attacks on public services, wages, pensions and trade union rights were carried out 
by Social Democratic governments – in Greece, in Spain and in Portugal, until they all were 
ousted from their government offices by frustrated voters and replaced by right wing 
governments? 
 This has of course to do with power relations in society and the deep political crisis on the 
left. It is not common sense but the prevailing balance of power, mainly between labour and 
capital, that decides what ‘solutions’ are chosen. If reason prevailed, one would naturally have 
stopped the meaningless speculation economy via regulations, by gaining increased democratic 
control over banks and other financial institutions. One would have stimulated the economy, 
invested in infrastructures and in productive activities to create jobs, as well as strengthened the 
social security network. 
 Within the prevailing power relations, however, this was not the policy of choice. The 
neoliberals and speculators who contributed most to causing the crisis are still in the driving seat. 
The interests of financial capital are therefore given priority. As many people have pointed out, 
the EU’s rescue packages are not primarily designed to save Greece, Ireland, Portugal and other 
countries that might follow, but the German, French and British banks that these countries had 
borrowed money from.  
 The EU’s role in this development is pivotal. In addition to the democratic deficit that is 
built into the EU institutions, they have to a large extent acquired their form and content during 
the neoliberal era. They are therefore dominated by the interests of capital. Through the Lisbon 
Treaty neoliberalism is constitutionalised as the economic system of the EU. The EU 
Commission, The European Central Bank and The International Monetary Fund (IMF) – 
popularly known as the triad – are now, together with national governments, using the crisis to 
further reshape societies to suit the interests of financial capital. This is a recipe for depression and 
social crisis. 
 In this picture, the lack of political alternatives on the left is striking. The current deep 
ideological and political crisis on the broad left can only be understood in the context of the 
rather socially peaceful post World War II period, the heyday of the social welfare state and the 
existence of a class compromise between labour and capital in Europe. This historic compromise 
was the result of a very specific historic development, in which capitalist forces gave concessions 
to the well organised working class in Western Europe to damp its radicalism and win workers’ 
support in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. However, in the dominant trade union and 
labour movements these historic specific achievements gradually formed the basis for a 
generalised social partnership ideology which became more and more delinked from an analysis of 
the power relations on which it was built. Thus, it also led to a certain depoliticisation and 
deradicalisation of the trade union and labour movement. The historic role of the Social 
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Democratic Parties became to administer the class compromise, rather than to mobilise the 
working class for further social progress.  
 What we have seen in Europe over the last 30 years is therefore governments which have 
pursued some kind of neoliberal policies, although in different doses, whether they have been 
right wing, centre or so-called centre-left. The Social Democratic Parties in the EU member 
countries have, without exception, supported all the neoliberal constitutional developments in the 
EU, and the entire construction of the Single Market, which in reality has been a systematic 
project of deregulation, privatisation and undermining of trade unions and social welfare. The 
few examples we have seen of political parties to the left of Social Democracy joining 
governments as junior partners of Social Democratic Parties (in France, Italy and Norway) have 
proved anything from negative to disastrous. None of them have been able to contain neoliberal 
policies, and they have therefore lost confidence among workers. 
 Most of the European trade union confederations are clinging to what in EU language is 
called ‘social dialogue’. This means that they act as if the class compromise is still intact, and that 
peaceful bi- and tripartite cooperation between labour, capital and the state is still the most 
effective way of promoting the interests of workers. That the class compromise has come to an 
end, and that the social forces with whom they seek dialogue are attacking public services, wages, 
pensions and trade union rights day and night, do not seem to weaken most European trade 
union confederations’ belief in social dialogue as the main way forward.  
 Anyway, the social struggle in Europe is entering a new phase. The crisis polarises 
differences and provokes confrontations particularly at the local and national level. General strikes 
are back on the union agendas in many countries, particularly in Greece, where the population is 
being exposed to draconian measures that threaten their general economic and social living 
conditions. In Portugal, Italy, Spain, France, Ireland and Great Britain general strikes and mass 
demonstrations have also been carried out, though with differing degrees of strength and 
intensity. Even if the outcome of these struggles so far is pretty uncertain, here is where we can 
find hope for the future – together with other, new and untraditional social movements. The 
European social model, such as we know it from its heyday, has at any rate been abandoned in 
reality by the European elites, even if they continue to pay lip-service to it. 
 A democratic solution to this crisis will require massive mobilisation in order to change 
the balance of power in society. Only if the trade union, labour and social movements are strong 
enough to pose a threat to the existing economic order, will the speculators and their political 
servants start to give in. That is why support for those who are now fighting to contain this 
cutback policy is so crucial. The restructuring of the political left will have to be part of the task. 
Either the trade union, labour and social movements manage to defend the social progress gained 
via the welfare state, or they risk being left with a right-wing authoritarian and socially degraded 
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